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Résumé / Abstract
Nous étudions la classe de jeux différentiels dont léquation de transition
et les contraintes sont caractérisées par lhomogénéité du premier degré. Nous
prouvons que si la fonction dobjectif possède lhomogénéité du degré ", alors la
meilleure réponse aux stratégies markoviennes qui possèdent lhomogénéité du
premier degré doit avoir la même propriété, et la fonction de valeur est caractérisée
par lhomogénéité du degré ". On obtient un résultat similaire dans le cas dune
transformation logarithmique de la fonction dobjectif. Larticle contient trois
exemples.
We consider the class of differential games with transition dynamics
and constraints that are homogeneous of degree one. We show that if the
integrand of the objective function is homogeneous of degree ", then best replies
to linear homogeneousMarkov strategies are linear homogeneous, and the value
function is homogeneous of degree ". A parallel result holds when one applies
logarithmic transformation to the integrand. Examples are provided.
Mots clés : Jeux différentiels, Équilibres markoviens.
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1. Introduction
Dierential games (and their discrete time counterparts) have been increasingly
used by economists to model strategic interactions of economic agents when the
state of the system changes over time. Often the strategy space is restricted to
include only strategies that condition actions on the current value of the state vari-
ables. These strategies are called Markov strategies. Even with this restriction,
the multiplicity of Nash equilibria is a common feature of dierential games. Equi-
librium selection has been a subject of intensive research, and there is a plethora
of criteria for selection, with varying degrees of sophistication. In many models,
there exist equilibrium strategies that are linear in the state variables. The least
that can be said in favor of these equilibria is that linear rules are simple and save
computational eorts.
In this paper, we show that for a class of model, best replies to linear strategies
are themselves linear. In section 2, the main propositions are stated and proved.
Section 3 contains some examples in continuous time. The discrete time versions
of the propositions are stated in Section 4, and an example in discrete time is
provided.
2. The Model in Continuous Time
We consider a continuous time dierential game with two players. (Our results
generalize easily to games with N players.) There are n state variables and each
player has m control variables. These are denoted by x 2 R
n
+
, c
1
2 R
m
+
and
c
2
2 R
m
+
. The evolution of the state variables is given by :

x
= F (x; c
1
; c
2
) , (2.1)
where F is a vector of n functions, F
1
,F
2
,..., F
n
. There are also h inequality
constraints:
G (x; c
1
; c
2
)  0 (2.2)
A player i is said to follow a Markov strategy if c
i
(t) is uniquely determined
by the current value of the state variables :
c
i
(t) = X
i
(x (t)) (2.3)
where X
i
is a function from R
n
+
to R
m
+
. Player i has the utility function U
i
(c
i
).
Given player i's Markov strategy X
i
, we dene player j's best reply to X
i
as a Markov strategy X
j
such that for all t and all x (t), player j's integral of
discounted utility using X
j
is at least as great as what he could get under any
other alternative strategy c
j
(t) = g
j
(x (t)). In symbols,
V
j
(x (t)) =
Z
1
t
e
 r(s t)
U
j
[X
j
(x (s))]ds 
Z
1
t
e
 r(s t)
U
j
[g
j
(x (s))] ds (2.4)
where x (s) is the solution of

x
(s) = F [x;X
i
(x) ;X
j
(x)] ; s  t (2.5)
with x (t) given, and x (s) is the solution of

x
(s) = F [x;X
i
(x) ; g
j
(x)] ; s  t (2.6)
with x (t) given.
A Markov perfect equilibrium is a pair of Markov strategies that are best
replies to each other.
We can now state our main result:
Proposition 1 : Assume that U
j
is homogeneous of degree  > 0, that Fand
G are homogeneous of degree one in (x; c
1
; c
2
), and that player j's opponent uses
a Markov strategy that is homogeneous of degree one. Then
(i) Player j's best reply is homogeneous of degree one in x.
(ii) V
j
(x (t)) is homogeneous of degree  in x.
Proof : Without loss of generality, let t = 0 and x (0) = b. Given X
i
and
given x (0) = b, player j's best reply X
j
yields a time path for c
j
, which we denote
by
2
cj
(s) =  (s; b) (2.7)
This time path solves the optimal control problem
Max
Z
1
0
e
 rs
U
j
(c
j
(s)) ds (2.8)
subject to

x
= F [x;X
i
(x) ; c
j
] ; G [x;X
i
(x) ; c
j
]  0 (2.9)
x (0) = b (2.10)
The associated time path for the state variables is denoted by
x (s) =  (s; b) (2.11)
We claim that if x (0) = b ( > 0), then the control path  (s; b) is feasible
and the associated path for the state variables is  (s; b). This is obvious, be-
cause F is homogeneous of degree one, and player i's strategy is, by assumption,
homogeneous of degree one.
It remains to prove that, with x (0) = b, the feasible control path  (s; b) is
optimal. We use the method of proof by contradiction. Suppose  (s; b) is not
optimal for x (0) = b. Then there exists a feasible consumption path
e
c
j
(s) such
that
Z
1
0
e
 rs
U
j
(
e
c
j
(s)) ds >
Z
1
0
e
 rs
U
j
( (s; b)) ds (2.12)
It follows that, for x (0) = b, the feasible control
1

e
c
j
(s) gives the following
integral of discounted utility ow :
I =
Z
1
0
e
 rs
U
j

1

e
c
j
(s)

ds =
Z
1
0
e
 rs

1



U
j
(
e
c
j
(s)) ds (2.13)
Therefore
3
I >

1



Z
1
0
e
 rs
U
j
( (s; b)) ds =
Z
1
0
e
 rs
U
j
( (s; b)) ds (2.14)
This is in contradiction with the fact that  (s; b) solves the optimal control
problem (2.8) subject to (2.9) and (2.10). Thus (i) is proved.
To prove (ii), we note that
V
j
(b) =
Z
1
0
e
 rs
U
j
( (s; b)) ds (2.15)
and, from (i),
V
j
(b) =
Z
1
0
e
 rs
U
j
( (s; b)) ds (2.16)
From (2.15), (2.16) and the assumption that U
j
(c
j
)is homogeneous of degree
,
V
j
(b) = 

V
j
(b) (2.17)
This completes the proof of proposition 1.
It is easy to adapt the proof of proposition 1 to prove the following result :
Proposition 2 : Assume, instead, that U
j
= ln [W (c
j
)], where W(c
j
) is
homogeneous of degree  > 0. Then, given the other assumptions stated in
proposition 1, the following results obtain:
(i) Player j's best reply is homogeneous of degree one in x:
(ii) V
j
(x (t)) satises the following property:
V
j
(x (t)) =
 ln
r
+ V
j
(x (t)) (2.18)
Proof :
4
Part (i) : replace (2.13) and (2.14) by
I =
Z
1
0
e
 rs
ln

W

1

e
c
j
(s)

ds =  
 ln
r
+
Z
1
0
e
 rs
lnW (
e
c
j
(s)) ds (2.19)
I >  
 ln
r
+
Z
1
0
e
 rs
ln [W ( (s; b))] ds =
Z
1
0
e
 rs
ln [W ( (b))] ds (2.20)
Part (ii) : use an argument parallel to the proof of part (ii) of proposition 1.
Corollary : Under the assumption of proposition 2, if x is a scalar (i.e. there
is only one state variable) then
V
j
(x) =
 lnx
r
+B (2.21)
where B is a constant.
Proof :
Write x = x+ (   1)x. Then , from (2.18)
V (x+ (  1) x)  V (x) =
 ln
r
(2.22)
Divide both sides of (2.22) by (  1) x and take the limit as  tends to 1.
The resulting left hand side is the derivative of V with respect to x, and the right
hand side is =xr. This completes the proof.
3. Some examples
We now illustrate our results by some examples.
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3.1. Example 1 : A resource with declining eectiveness.
Our rst example is an instance of a class of problems studied by Cornes, Long
and Shimomura (1994). It concerns the long term decline in eectiveness of a
pesticide. Let x (t) denote the eectiveness of the pesticide, and a
i
(t) the rate of
application of the pesticide by farmer i. There are N farmers. The aggregate rate
of application is
a (t) =
N
X
i=1
a
i
(t) : (3.1)
Insects tend to develop resistance to pesticides over time. To capture this
feature, we suppose that x (t) declines with aggregate application :

x
(t) =  a (t) (3.2)
The decline in eectiveness means that we must distinguish the nominal doses,
a
i
(t), from the eective doses a
i
(t)x (t). We assume that each farmer's prot is
an increasing function of the eective doses that he applies to his eld :

i
(t) = [a
i
(t)x (t)]

2
; 0 <  < 1 (3.3)
Each farmer wants to maximize the integral of the discounted prot ow:
Max
Z
T
i
0

i
(t) e
 rt
dt (3.4)
It is understood that when x becomes zero, the pesticide becomes worthless.
A convenient way to take this into account is to impose the following constraint
on problem (3.4) :
x (T
i
)  0 (3.5)
We allow each rm to choose its own terminal time T
i
.
While it is possible to solve the above dierential game problem directly, it is
convenient to transform variables so that proposition 1 can be applied. Dene a
new control variable
c
i
(t) = [a
i
(t)x (t)]
1
2
(3.6)
Then, from (3.2), (3.3) and (3.6)
6

x
(t) =  
N
X
i=1
c
2
i
.
x (3.7)

i
(t) = [c
i
(t)]

(3.8)
It follow from proposition 1 that farmer i's best reply is of the form
c
i
(t) = 
i
x (t) (3.9)
if all other farmers use linear strategies
c
j
(t) = 
j
x (t) ; j 6= i (3.10)
In what follows, we focus on a symmetric solution. The Bellman-Hamilton-
Jacobi equation for the representative farmer i is
rV
i
(x) =Max
"
c

i
+ V
0
i
(x)
 
 
c
2
i
x
  (N   1) 
2
x
!#
(3.11)
where the maximization is with respect to c
i
and where 
j
=  for all j 6= i.
Applying proposition 1, we write
V
i
(x) = Ax

(3.12)
and (3.11) becomes
rAx

=Max
"
c

i
  Ax
 1
 
(N   1)
2
x+
c
2
i
x
!#
(3.13)
This yields the rst order condition
c
 1
i
= 2Ax
 1
(c
i
=x) (3.14)
or
c
i
= x (2A)
1
 2
(3.15)
Substituting (3.15) into (3.13), and using the assumption of a symmetric so-
lution, we obtain
rAx

= (2A)

 2

1 
N
2

x

(3.16)
7
Since A is non-negative (rms do not make losses in equilibrium), equation
(3.16) implies that a symmetric equilibrium in linear strategies exists if and only
if N <
2

. Under this assumption, the eectiveness of the pesticide declines to
zero only asymptotically. The equilibrium time horizon is innite. Solving (3.16)
for A and substituting into (3.15), we obtain the linear strategy
c
i
=

r
2  N

1
2
x (3.17)
provided that N <
2

. The nominal doses are
a
i
= c
2
i
=x =
rx
2  N
(3.18)
As N approaches
2

from below, a
i
tends to innity.
3.2. Example 2 : Exploiting a common pool.
This example is a special case of the class of problems studied by Clemhout and
Wan (1985). Let x (t) denote the stock of oil in a common pool. The N players
are the countries that have access to the pool. Their rates of extraction are c
i
(t),
i = 1; 2; :::; N . The utility function for player i is U (c
i
) = ln (c

i
). The transition
equation is

x
=  
N
X
i=1
c
i
(3.19)
We assume that the time horizon is innite, and all countries maximize the
integral of discounted utility.
If player i believes that all other players use the strategy
c
j
= x (3.20)
then, according to proposition 2, its best reply must be of the form
c
i
= 
i
x (3.21)
The Bellman-Hamilton-Jacobi equation for player i is
rV
i
(x) =Max
h
ln c

i
+ V
0
i
(x) ( c
i
  (N   1) x)
i
(3.22)
8
According to the corollary to proposition 2, rV
i
(x) must be of the formA lnx+
B. Use this in (3.22) to obtain.
rA lnx+ rB =Max

ln c

i
 
A
x
(c
i
+ (N   1) x)

(3.23)
The rst order condition yields
c
i
= x=A (3.24)
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, we have
 = =A (3.25)
Substitute (3.24) and (3.25) into (3.22) to obtain
rA lnx+ rB =  lnx+ ln (=A)

  N (3.26)
Since the above equation must hold for all x > 0, it follows that
A = =r (3.27)
rB = ln (=A)  N (3.28)
The equilibrium rate of extraction is therefore
c
i
(t) = rx (t) (3.29)
It is interesting to observe that the strategy (3.29) is independent of the num-
ber of players. This contrasts sharply with (3.17). Finally, from (3.29) and (3.19),

x
=x =  rN (3.30)
4. The Discrete Time Versions
It is clear that propositions 1 and 2 also apply in discrete time. The only modi-
cations are that (2.1) and (2.4) are replaced by their discrete time counterparts:
x (t+ 1)   x (t) = F (x (t) ; c
1
(t) ; c
2
(t)) (4.1)
9
Vj
(x (t)) =
1
X
s=t
U
j
[X
j
(x (s))] b
s t
(4.2)
where 0 < b < 1 is the discount factor.
An example : Exploitation of renewable resources.
Consider a pool in which two species of sh coexist. Let X
t
and Y
t
denote
the current stocks, and C
t
and D
t
the corresponding rates of harvest. We assume
that
X
t+1
= (X
t
 C
t
)

1
Y

1
t
(4.3)
Y
t+1
= (Y
t
 D
t
)

2
X

2
t
(4.4)
where 1 > 
i
> 0 while 
i
can be positive or negative. If both 
1
and 
2
are
negative, the two species are said to be mutually competing; if both 
i
are positive,
they are symbiotic species; while if 
1
is positive and 
2
is negative, then X are
the predators and Y are the preys. Our formulation slightly diers from that of
Fischer and Mirman (1992a, 1992b), who assume that both C
t
and D
t
appear in
each growth equation. We will focus on the special case where 
i
+ 
i
= 1,which
was not considered by Fischer and Mirman.
Assume that there are two countries that have common access to the shing
pool. Their rates of catch are C
it
and D
it
, i = 1; 2, such that, by denition
C
1t
+ C
2t
= C
t
(4.5)
D
1t
+D
2t
= D
t
(4.6)
Suppose that country i believes that country j follows the linear shing rules :
C
jt
= 
j
X
t
(4.7)
D
jt
= 
j
Y
t
(4.8)
If we assume that utility functions are
10
Ui
= lnC
i
+ lnD
i
(4.9)
for i = 1; 2, then it follows from our proposition 2 that the best reply is homoge-
neous of degree one in the stocks. This can be explicitly calculated by considering
a value function of the form
V
i
= A
i
lnX +B
i
lnY + E
i
(4.10)
The Bellman equation is
V
i
(X
t;
Y
t
) =Max [lnC
it
+ lnD
it
+ bV
i
(X
t+1
; Y
t+1
)] (4.11)
Substituting (4.7), (4.8) into (4.3) , (4.4), and maximizing the right-hand side of
(4.11) with respect to C
it
and D
it
give
(1 + b
1
A
i
)C
i
= X (1   
j
) (4.12)
(1 + b
2
B
i
)D
i
= Y (1   
j
) (4.13)
Substituting (4.12) and (4.13) into (4.11), we obtain the following equations
A
i
= 1 + b
1
A
i
+ b
2
B
i
(4.14)
B
i
= 1 + b
2
B
i
+ b
1
A
i
(4.15)
Solving for A
i
and B
i
A
i
= (1  b
2
+ b
2
) =4 (4.16)
B
i
= (1  b
1
+ b
1
) =4 (4.17)
where
4 = (1  b
1
) (1  b
2
)  b
2

1

2
(4.18)
In what follows we assume that 4 > 0 and that

i
  
i
< 1 (4.19)
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so that both A
i
and B
i
are positive. It follows that the best reply strategies of
country i are linear :
C
i
= 
i
X (4.20)
D
i
= 
i
Y (4.21)
where

i
=
(1  
j
)
1 + b
2
A
i
(4.22)

i
=
(1  
j
)
1 + b
2
B
i
(4.23)
Furthermore, as it is clear that A
i
= A
j
= A and B
i
= B
j
= B, we must have

i
= 
j
=  and 
i
= 
j
= , i.e. the linear strategies are necessarily symmetric :

i
= 
j
=  =
1
2 + b
1
A
<
1
2
(4.24)

i
= 
j
=  =
1
2 + b
2
B
<
1
2
(4.25)
From (4.3), (4.4), (4.7), (4.8), (4.20), (4.21), (4.24) and (4.25), the evolution
of the system is given by
X
t+1
= [X
t
(1   2)]

1
Y

1
t
(4.26)
Y
t+1
= [Y
t
(1   2)]

2
Y

2
t
(4.27)
Let
x = lnX ; y = lnY (4.28)
 =   ln (1  2) > 0 (4.29)
 =   ln (1   2) > 0 (4.30)
The system (4.26) and (4.27) can be written as
12
xt+1
= 
1
x
t
+ 
1
y
t
   (4.31)
y
t+1
= 
2
x
t
+ 
2
y
t
   (4.32)
This system is equivalent to the following second order dierence equation in x
x
t+2
  (
1
+ 
2
) x
t+1
+ (
1

2
  
1

2
) x
t
=    
1
 (4.33)
Since 
i
+ 
i
= 1, the characteristic equation of (4.33) has two roots, r
1
= 1,
and
 1 < r
2
= 
1
+ 
2
  1 < 1 (4.34)
The general solution of (4.33) is of the form
x
t
= E + Ft+G (
1
+ 
2
  1)
t
(4.35)
where E and G are arbitrary constants, and
F =
   (1  
1
)
2  
1
  
2
< 0 (4.36)
Therefore x will tend to minus innity, implying that X will tend to zero, as t
tends to innity. A similar argument shows that Y will also tend to zero.
We have shown that along the Markov equilibrium path, both species are
driven to extinction. It can be shown that if the two countries cooperate to
maximize the sum of their utility ows, extinction is also optimal, but exploitation
will be at a slower rate.
13
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